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SOME PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND PROCEDURE IN THE
CONDUCT OF REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS
CARLOS L. IsRAELs t
"The Law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent,
It has no kind of fault or flaw . "
"Things are seldom what they seem,
Skim milk masquerades as cream."
W. S. Gilbert *
The origins of modem reorganization practice do not lie in bank-
ruptcy. An understanding of the major procedural steps and problems
involved in the conduct of a typical reorganization proceeding under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, therefore, requires some knowledge
of its historical background. At the outset, it must be assumed that a
debtor's financial condition is such that reorganization rather than
liquidation is indicated. This does not necessarily mean that it is
solvent in the bankruptcy sense and insolvent merely in that it cannot
meet its debts as they mature in the ordinary course of business. It
does mean that the enterprise is one of conceded economic value, worth
preserving as a going concern from the standpoint of its creditors, if
not its stockholders.
In the typical case, a corporate debtor will, perhaps, be unable to
meet a maturing installment of interest or principal on its funded debt.
It may be that a "voluntary" plan of reorganization has been tried and
failed, the bondholders, perhaps, not having sufficient confidence in the
management and future prosperity of the debtor to reduce their claims
for interest or to place them upon an income basis, even though some
t A. B., 1925, Amherst College; LL. B., 1928, Columbia University; member of
the New York Bar; author of TE AmixSTAATiO N OF JUSTICE IN SovIEr RussIA IN
THE SEcoxD DECADE (W928) ; co-author with Milton A. Kramer of The Significance
of the Income Clause in a Corporate Mortgage (i93o) 30 CoL. L. RFV. 488, contributor
to legal periodicals.
* This article is a development of lecture material used by the writer at the Prac-
ticing Law Institute, New York City, in the courses on Corporate Practice and on
Bankruptcy and Reorganization. My distinguished co-contributors to this issue will
"embody the law" for the benefit of the readers of this REVIEW. The writer's task is
different-to undertake to present in brief compass some demonstration of the back-
ground which, in his view, makes the second of the foregoing quotations, rather than
the first, applicable to reorganization practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy
Act, and to attempt an evaluation of some of the benefits and remaining deficiencies of
reorganization technique as it is used today, from the standpoint of the practicing
lawyer who, in one or another capacity, will share in the active conduct of a proceed-
ing. The quotations are extracted from lolanthe, Act I, and H. M. S. Pinafore, Act IL
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compensation therefor may be offered in the form of equity participa-
tion. Time, and a respite from creditors' pressure are required. Only
a court with broad injunctive powers can provide these and, during the
interval, give parties in interest time to negotiate, and the court ade-
quate opportunity to consider the fairness, equity and feasibility of any
proposed readjustment.
There are four major stages of the reorganization process, each
meriting separate consideration. They are:
i. The obtaining of jurisdiction over the debtor's property.
2. The problem of personnel and technique of administration
of that property under court supervision.
3. The problem of formulation and court approval of a plan.
4. The consummation of that plan (including its approval by
creditors and stockholders).
1
I. THaE BACKGROUND
At each of these stages, problems of policy and administration of
greater or less importance have arisen. Among these were the prob-
lems of jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of the reorganization
court and the necessity for payment of dissenting creditors in cash.
Attempts have been made to deal with them through judicial precedent
and by statute.
The reorganization acts 2 are the result of a half century of ex-
perience. They are a synthesis of the views of several groups-a group
i. These categories are, of course, arbitrary. The placing of security-holder ap-
proval at the fourth stage is dictated by the apparent theory of Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1938. Under earlier practice, "consummation" was a more or less
mechanical process.
2. Sections 77 and 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (added in 1933 and 1934 re-
spectively) and Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (the Chandler Act) will be
loosely referred to herein as "the reorganization acts". Section 77, 47 STAT. 1474
(1933), was substantially amended in 1935, 49 STAT. 911, II U. S. C. A. § 205 (1935).
It deals exclusively with the reorganiation of interstate railroads. Though some under-
standing of railroad reorganization is necessary to a discussion of industrial and real
estate reorganizations, Section 77 will not be considered in detail here, since its pro-
visions, particularly since 1935, are peculiar to railroads. In its present- version, it has
been much criticized, primarily for the inevitable delays which procedure under it in-
volves, particularly the necessity for. two full-dress hearings on the fairness of any
plan-one before the Interstate Commerce Commission and the other before the court
prior to the submission of that plan to security holders. No Class I railroad has yet
been discharged from reorganization under its provisions, despite the fact that it has
been on the statute books for seven years, and that some of the proceedings now pend-
ing under it were instituted in its earliest days; e. g., Wabash, Rock Island, Frisco,
Missouri-Pacific and Milwaukee.
- Section 77B, 48 STAT. 912, 1I U. S. C. A. § 207 (i934) was superseded by Chapter
X in 1938, 52 STAT. 883, II U. S. C. A. §§ 5o1-676 (1938). These sections amend Sec-
tion 77B along with other sections of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and are applicable
to any proceeding instituted within three months prior to its effective date, June 22,
x938, and "to the extent that the judge shall deem practicable", are to be applied to
proceedings previously instituted under Section 77B.
For a time, it seemed that Chapter XI of the 1938 Act, 52 STAT. 9o5, ii U. S. C.
A. §§ 701-799 (1938), might also be considered, to some extent, to supersede Section
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of active practitioners in the reorganization field,3 a group of active
bankruptcy practitioners, and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.4 The result is, naturally, something of a hybrid. If it be borne
in mind, however, where the origins lie and that the reorganization
acts are bankruptcy statutes primarily for constitutional reasons, the
picture clears. By resort to the bankruptcy power of Congress, an
easy way was found to give a federal court jurisdiction over all of a
debtor's property located in more than one state or federal district.
There, also, lay the clear power to do away with cash payments to
dissenting creditors. Broadly speaking, the reorganization acts are
bankruptcy statutes in name only. At least, as Sections 77 and 77B
were originally enacted, ordinary bankruptcy practice and procedure
were written into them as sparingly as seemed required and bankruptcy
courts in reorganization proceedings were specifically granted all the
powers of a federal court sitting in equity. In Chapter X, as will
appear, the influence of the bankruptcy group among the draftsmen
was more powerful, 5 but still no disturbance to the fundamental pattern
resulted.
Reorganization procedure was first worked out in the railroad
cases where the fact that railroads could not become bankrupts, com-
bined with the public interest in their continued operation, made un-
suitable the normal processes for enforcement of creditors' claims by
piecemeal execution sales of the defendant's property. State court
procedures were found inadequate or restricted in scope by reason of
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of state courts and, in many
instances, the lack of general equity powers in those courts. There-
fore, the federal equity receivership, originally designed as a remedy
in aid of execution after judgment, looking toward the marshalling
and liquidation by sale of the defendant's assets, was adapted to the
opposite purliose-the preservation of those assets as a going concern
pending readjustment of the rights of creditors and stockholders.
77B; that where a corporation had only an unsecured debt, no matter what its amount
or public distribution, resort might be had to a simple procedure, akin to a composition
under Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Such was not the intention of the
draftsmen of Chapter XI, and their views have been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Securities & Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 6o
Sup. Ct. IO44 (194o).
For a succinct history of reorganization procedure, see FiNI.rr a PRINCIPLES OF
CoRPoRATE REORGANIZATiON IN BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1939) 1-34; for a discussion of
the nature, antecedents and constitutionality of Section 77B, see I GErnDs, Co PORATE
REORGANIZATIONS (1936) chapters i and 2; for the particular origins of Chapter X,
see Heuston, Corporate Reorganization under the Chandler Act (1938) 38 CoL. L. Ray.
II99.
3. Typified by a special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York.
4. Heuston, note 2 supra at i2o4.
5. Ibid.
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Once it became evident that a railroad could not meet its debts as
they matured in the ordinary course of business, reorganization was
indicated. To bring the property within the jurisdiction of the federal
court was no easy task. Indenture trustees, to which a maturing in-
stallment of interest which might be the cause of the anticipated default
was owed, could not yet move. By the time that installment had
matured and the period of grace allowed under the mortgage had ex-
pired, individual bondholders might have sued on coupons and general
creditors might have obtained state court judgments and levied execu-
tions thereunder. In any event, suit by the indenture trustee would
be in foreclosure. Receivership as an aid to foreclosure had long been
recognized, but its incidence would be upon the mortgaged assets only.
Thus, it would fail of its purpose to bring the entire operating entity
within the jurisdiction of the court.6
In addition, it was deemed desirable that the conduct of the pro-
ceedings be in friendly hands. A "foreign" general creditor was, there-
fore, found who was owed more than the jurisdictional amount. That
creditor filed a bill of complaint in the selected forum 7 alleging that
the road was insolvent in that it could not meet its debts in the
ordinary course of business, but that its assets were of substantially
greater value than its liabilities and required preservation pending
their marshalling and sale in satisfaction of the defendant's debts.
The bill had a jurisdictional defect. It failed to allege the ex-
istence of a judgment in favor of the complainant and the return of
execution unsatisfied. That defect was "cured" or "waived" by the
filing of an answer in which the defendant admitted the allegations of
the bill and joined in the prayer for the appointment of a receiver. In
effect, therefore, the receivership was a voluntary one. Once the re-
ceiver was appointed in the primary jurisdiction, there would occur a
race for ancillary jurisdiction. Ancillary bills of complaint, answers
and orders appointing receivers had to be submitted at least in every
judicial circuit where the road had property and, if that property were
not physically interconnected, in each federal district.
8
The rule of comity usually dictated the appointment of the same
receivers, but counsel did not breathe easily until this was accom-
plished. Thereafter, as bond issues went into default, indenture trus-
tees applied to the receivership court for leave to foreclose their mort-
6. Israels and Kramer, The Significance of the Income Clause in a Corporate
Mortgage (1930) 30 CoL. L. REV. 489, and cases cited. Cf. Kneeland v. American
Loan & Trust Co., 136 U. S. 89 (i8go).
7. Usually the jurisdiction in which the principal offices of the road were located,
not always the state of incorporation.
8. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923) interpreting Sec-
tions 55 and 56 of the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. i102 (19"1), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ I16-II7
(1927).
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gages either by intervention or by separate suit which would be
promptly consolidated with the receivership, and sought and obtained
I he "extension" of the receivership to the foreclosure bills. The ground
of jurisdiction of these foreclosure suits was simply that the property
was already under administration by the federal court. Diversity of
citizenship was no longer necessary.
The procedure was quickly adapted to public utility and to indus-
trial and real estate corporations, although Mr. Justice Brandeis
warned, as late as 1934, that:
"All the cases in which this court appears to have exercised this
.power in aid of reorganization upon the ground of insolvency
dealt with railroads or other public utilities where continued oper-
ation of the property and preservation of its unity seemed to be
required in the public interest." "
During receivership, the litigation aspect of the proceeding might
be somnolent for months or years, save for the perfunctory observance
of the technicalities of foreclosure or the trial or argument of con-
troversies as to conflicting liens or preferred claims, 01 until a plan of
reorganization had been agreed upon by interests nominally unrepre-
sented before the court-usually securityholders' committees. Then
a decree of sale would be presented recognizing for the first time in the
proceeding that reorganization might have been in view. That decree
provided for a sale at public auction. Bidders were required to
"qualify" in advance by making substantial deposits of cash or claims
and, if it was proposed to bid pursuant to any plan of reorganization,
to file a copy of that plan, the fairness and equity of which, if the bidder
were successful, would be passed upon by the court as an incident to
confirmation of the sale. The sale, theoretically at "public" auction,
was in the vast majority of cases a meaningless and expensive gesture."'
Competitive bidding was almost non-existent, but for the protection of
dissenting creditors, the property was carefully parcelled according to
the liens and upset prices placed upon the individual parcels and upon
the entirety, prices not representing the value of the property, but
merely the lowest figures at which the court felt it might permit the
majority to buy off the dissenters.' 2 The property was purchased pur-
9. First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershern, 290 U. S. 504, 515 ('934).
(Italics added.)
io. This was a fertile field of controversy. See FitzGibbon, The Present Status
of the Six Months Rule (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 230.
ii. Cf. Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A.
8th, 1922) and the procedure suggested in the District Court, referred to in National
Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 46 (I933).
12. II Gmas, op. cit. supra note 2 at 1686 et seq.; Spring, Upset Prices in Cor-
porate Reorganization (x929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 899; Weiner, Conflicting Functions
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suant to the plan by reorganization managers who transferred their bid
to a new corporation in consideration of its promise to issue its se-
curities in accordance with the plan upon the order of the committees.
Confirmation of sale and incident approval of the plan was the final
step.
The technique was fictional in important respects. Attempts at
judicial realism, such as Judge Sanborn's decree in the Rock Island
case, returning the property to the debtor and enjoining future inter-
ference therewith, met with well founded doubts as to their validity. 13
II. OBTAINING JURISDICTION
At the first stage-obtaining jurisdiction over the debtor's prop-
erty-the procedure was greatly simplified by the reorganization acts
which eliminated the problem of ancillary proceedings and provided for
the filing of a voluntary petition frankly stating its purpose-the accom-
plishment of reorganization.
14
Involuntary proceedings were also provided for. Under Section
77B, three creditors having claims aggregating $i,ooo or more above
the value of their security, if any, could file an involuntary petition.
In the ordinary case, however, a petition filed by secured bondholders
would merely open the way for a contest as to the value of the mort-
gaged assets, if not on the issue of insolvency or the existence of an
act of bankruptcy. Chapter X is more realistic. The holders of $5,00o
in total debt, secured or unsecured, may file an involuntary petition, as
may an indenture trustee. Such a petition need not show an act of
bankruptcy, provided it be shown that the debtor has been adjudicated
a bankrupt in a pending proceeding, or that a receiver or trustee has
been appointed for or has taken charge of all or a greater portion of
the debtor's property, or that an indenture trustee is, by reason of
default, in possession of such property, or that a proceeding to fore-
of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization (1927) 27 COL. L. RE-V. 132. Under
the reorganization acts, the function of the upset price may be somewhat different. A
more definite relation to value on some basis is indicated. See FINLarrER, op. cit. supra
note 2 at 446, 526-530.
13. Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922). The validity of the procedure in this case was not passed upon by the Supreme
Court, and was the subject of serious controversy. See Rosenberg, A New Scheme of
Reorganization (917) 17 COL. L. REv. 523, Reorganization-The Next Step (1922)
22 COL. L. REv. 14, Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. (1924) 24 COL L.
REV. 266, Swaine, Reorganization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. James N. Rosen-
berg (1922) 22 COL L. REv. 121, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Develop-
ments of the Last Decade (927) 27 COL. L. REV. 901; Walker, Reorganization by
Decree: Recent Noteworthy Instances (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. I54. The discussion
continued up to the passage by Congress of Section 77.
14. The contents of the petition are in other respects analogous to the equity bill of
complaint. They are indicated in Chapter X, § 126 et seq.
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close a mortgage or to enforce a lien against all or a greater portion of
the property of the debtor is pending.' 5
III. ADMINISTRATION
At the second stage, the acts have not been so helpful. Upon the
approval of the petition as properly filed, the court must struggle with
the most difficult unsolved problem of reorganization practice-the
appointment of trustees. A famous equity receivership judge is often
quoted as having said that it was his custom to appoint two receivers,
one who was familiar with the business and could operate it, and the
other in whom he had -personal confidence, to watch the first one.
Under Chapter X, this adage is reversed. The judge must ap-
point an "independent" trustee where the debtor owes more than
$25o,ooo. The function of that trustee is substantially broader than
that of an equity receiver or a trustee in ordinary bankruptcy. He
must assume responsibility not only for operations, but also for a
recommendation to the court as to whether or not an investigation
should be made of the debtor's affairs, the desirability of continuing
its business, the existence of possible causes of action against officers
and directors, etc. He must also conduct such investigation, if made,
and, at a later stage of the proceedings, formulate a plan. Only as to
operations may the independent trustee share his responsibility with a
co-trustee who may be a former officer, director or underwriter for the
debtor, but who is forbidden by statute from having anything to do
with the conduct of the proceeding or the formulation of a plan.
Under equity practice, prior to the enactment of Section 77B, the
most frequent criticism of court appointments of receivers was that
the court was too prone to listen to the argument of those in control
of the debtor, usually abetted by the "friendly" plaintiff, recommending
the appointment of a nominee of the management as sole receiver. In
the appointment of receivers in ordinary bankruptcy, on the other hand,
the most frequent criticism was that the judges used a list of political
"availables".
Section 77B, in effect, gave Congressional approval to the theory
of the friendly receivership by permitting the court to leave the debtor
itself in possession of and administering its own assets, with the legal
title of a trustee in bankruptcy. This practice has now been restricted
to cases where the debtor owes less than $25o,ooo, where the expense
of the fees of an independent trustee might prove unduly burdensome.
1s. There is a twilight zone between the date of filing and the date of approval of
an involuntary plan which bristles with unsolved questions. See Heuston, note 2 supra
at 1209-1210.
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Whether or not the change is salutary was bitterly argued before the
Congressional committees considering the Chandler Act.16 The stat-
utory solution-if it can be called that-is intended to assure to the
court at least integrity in management during reorganization, if not
detailed knowledge of the intricacies of the particular business, the way
being left open to obtain the latter through the appointment of a co-
trustee.'
7
The objection that political patronage might dictate trustee ap-
pointments is one that obviously cannot be overcome by statute, except,
perhaps, by requiring the appointment of a public official or govern-
mental body, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission.' 8
Attempts to overcome it, such as the rule in force for several years in
the Southern District of New York, requiring the appointment of a
particular trust company as receiver in all cases, raised such a storm
at the bar that Congress ended the practice by statute. In the last
analysis, the only sound criticism which can be levelled at the'provi-
sions of Chapter X in this regard is that there will be cases in which
the statutory necessity for an independent trustee will saddle upon the
estate an expense for which there may be no justification and may
deprive the enterprise of the services of one or more individuals fitted
by experience to guide its rehabilitation. If, in practice, the pressure
of securityholder opinion, the reorganization bar and the S. E. C.,
holds to a minimum the element of political patronage in the appoint-
ment of independent trustees, the price would seem reasonable.
Once the receiver had been appointed, equity practice decreed that
he.should concern himself solely with operations. 9  Chapter X, how-
ever, imposes some additional duties upon the independent trustee, the
incidence of which must be immediately noted. He must promptly
make a recommendation to the court as to whether or not an investiga-
tion should be made along the lines indicated above. The practice is
a logical development from the Section 21-a examinations conducted
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Chapter X also requires the filing
i6. Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1937) 164, 280-2, 286, 303, 307-8, 328, 336-46, 343, 357, 358, 367; Hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (193o) ii,
20-21, 29-30, 48, 74, 90-91, 93, 103.
17. An interesting discussion of the functioning of the independent trustees in two
important cases will be found in Gerdes, Recent Developments in Reorganizations under
the Bankruptcy Act (1940) 26 VA. L. REV. 999.
i8. This is contemplated by the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49
STAT. 820 (i935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79K (f) (Supp. i939). The provision has not been
used, although in the important Associated Gas & Electric Co. case, which is still pend
ing in the courts, its use was seriously considered.
ig. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 269 Fed. 497,
5oi (C. C. A. 5th, i92i) : "A receiver does not represent the justiciable rights of the
parties to the litigation of which he is receiver, but only the protection of the property
in his hands as such, or the collection of that to the possession of which, as receiver,
he is entitled."
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of schedules of assets and liabilities and lists of creditors and stock-
holders. Again, the origin is ordinary bankruptcy practice.20  The
statutory requirement that a judicial determination be made with regard
to an investigation of the debtor's affairs has, in the writer's view, one
important advantage-to determine quickly the economic desirability
of reorganization in the particular case. If there was one vice under
Section 77B and, to a lesser extent, in equity receivership, it was the
institution of proceedings looking toward reorganization where liquida-
tion only was justified.2 1
On the other hand, the most serious case against the investigation
is built upon the contention that it may involve a time-consuming
search for causes of action against management which are of doubtful
validity or, if they exist, of doubtful collectibility. One of the most
powerful influences in favor of expeditious reorganization is usually
the management group. If they are to be concerned with defending
themselves against claims of personal liability-and the existence of
such claims is argued in many cases-they are not so likely, until these
issues are disposed of, to concern themselves with reorganization.
22
The trustee and the court must exercise restraint and an informed
judgment to guide their decisions. The problem is human, not legal.
In his administration of the debtor's assets, the trustee in a re-
organization proceeding is guided by the detailed instructions embodied
in the court order appointing him. It may be a document many pages
in length, 28 the precedent for which lies in the railroad cases. The
trustee is directed to take possession of the assets wherever located;
his title thereto is confirmed; .4 he is directed to continue the business
and considerable detail in this regard will be set forth in any well
drawn order; he will be given directions as to handling the debtor's
funds, as to doing business on credit, as to continuing the services of
registrars and .transfer agents and as to many other points. The order
will provide for a specific period of time within which the trustee may
make his election as to the adoption or rejection of executory contracts
and leases subject to extension of that time upon further order of the
2o. See Heuston, note 2 supra at 1221 for a discussion of these provisions.
2x. See e. g., Judge Woolsey's comments in Muncipal Financial Corp. v. Bankus
Corp., 45 F. (2d) 9o2 (S. D. N. Y. 193o); FiN=.nrraa, op. cit. supra note 2, n. ii.
=. See Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923;
ef. Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations (1938) 38 CoL L. REv.
256; Gerdes, note 17 supra.
23. It is interesting to compare the form of order confirming the election of a trus-
tee in ordinary bankruptcy, which consists of but a few lines. The comparison provides
an illustration apposite to the fact that whereas ordinary bankruptcy was never gaited
for the operation of a complex business under judicial supervision, equity receivership
had developed this technique to a point where its principal features were thoroughly
familiar to the petitioners in the field.
24. This may include the right and duty to take possession of assets in the hands of
an indenture trustee. The point is debatable. See Heuston, note 2 supra at 1227.
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court. Interference with the possession of the trustee by foreclosure
of mortgages or otherwise will be specifically enjoined.
2 5
Broadly speaking, the purpose of this order is to permit the
trustee to operate the business of the debtor in substantially the manner
in which it had been operated by the debtor itself without constant
resort to the court or a special master for instructions on relatively
unimportant points. The trustee will, however, if well advised, request
instructions from time to time where any fundamental change of busi-
ness or financial policy is involved; for instance, where it is proposed
either to pay or to default on a maturing installment of interest on an
underlying bond issue-to contest what is considered to be an excessive
tax assessment-to establish a line of credit or to change credit terms
to customers.
Further, the power to borrow money upon trustees' certificates
has been clarified by the acts. Under equity practice, the power to
displace the lien of an existing mortgage was entirely unclear; except
in railroad and public utility cases for preservation, as distinct from
operation or betterment, of the debtor's property. Under Section 77B,
while the trustee had authority to borrow money and to issue certifi-
cates therefor upon such terms "as may be lawful in the particular
case", there remained doubt as to whether existing liens could be dis-
placed. Chapter X gives the judge clear power to permit borrowing
on certificates for any purpose which he deems proper, and provided
adequate notice be given, seems to permit displacement of liens regard-
less of the nature of the enterprise.
26
Other mechanical steps will also be taken. Landlords may attempt
to force the issue as to the acceptance or rejection of their leases.
Holders of executory contracts may take similar action. Indenture
trustees may seek to impound income for the benefit of their bond-
holders.
27
25. This provision is, of course, a departure from the equity practice, where the
court had no authority to enjoin a mortgage foreclosure beyond the point when the in-
denture trustee applied for permission to institute it. MacGregor v. Johnson-Cowdin-
Emmerich, 31 F. (2d) 27o (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Gay v. Hudson River Electric Power
Co., 184 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 2d, 1gII).
26. The issues are clearly drawn in the opinion of Evans, C. J., in In re Prima
Co., 88 F. (2d) 785 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) holding in favor of priority under Section 77B.
27. The situation here deserves some comment. Under equity practice, income did
not accrue to the indenture trustee until application had been made for the appointment
of a foreclosure receiver. FINLETTEl, op. cit. supra note 2, at 333-343; IsRAE.s AND
KRAMER, note 6 supra passim. By the same token, expenses incurred in an equity pro-
ceeding or a loss incurred in operations prior to the application were not chargeable
against the mortgaged property. MacGregor v. Johnson-Cowdin-Enmerich, 39 F. (2d)
574 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
The question of the date at which a mortgagee's application for the impounding of
income in a rcorganization proceeding shall be effective, if application be not made at
the time of the approval of the original petition, has not been settled. The decisions
are in conflict. See e. g., In re Wakey, 50 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) which
probably represents the more logical view, making the application effective as of the
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The reorganization acts have not dispensed with the necessity for
the litigation of conflicting claims of creditor groups. If controversies
exist as to priorities between groups of secured creditors, or between
secured and unsecured creditors, prompt steps should be taken to bring
them to a head. Intelligent compromise can more often be made after
contentions of the parties have been subjected to the cold light of trial
procedure and proof than while they remain in the realm of pure argu-
ment. The more complex the corporate structure, and the larger the
enterprise, the more likely it is that situations of this sort may arise.
In the writer's experience, counsel for junior interests, particularly for
unsecured creditors, have in many proceedings been ignorant of or
slept upon their clients' substantial claims to unmortgaged assets, the
existence and value of which might substantially improve their trading
positions when the stage of plan formulation is reached .
2
Chapter X contemplates that an order shall be made requiring the
proof of claims and interests by creditors and stockholders. 29  Ex-
perience dictates that no such order should be presented at an early
stage of the proceedings in contradistinction to ordinary bankruptcy
practice where a statutory six months' time limit is imposed. The
reason is that Chapter X departs from Section 77B by making specific
provision that votes for or against a plan of reorganization shall be
counted only if and when the voting securityholder has proved his
claim.30 If an order be submitted at an early stage of the proceedings
and a large number of claims proved, securityholders' inertia may later
block approval of a plan. Where claims are proved only in conjunction
with votes on a plan, whether those votes be negative or affirmative,
this cannot occur. This technique is, therefore, recommended at least
as to indenture securities where the indenture trustee's blanket claim
date of the original petition. Contra: In re Brose, 254 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
The concomitant problem of whether or not expenses incurred prior to the date of
the application may be imposed upon the mortgaged estate does not seem to have
arisen. As a practical matter, it will probably never arise except where reorganization
effort fails and liquidation ensues.
Undoubtedly the present-day tendency is for indenture trustees, particularly in view
of the new and stricter standard of vigilance imposed upon them after default by the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 1149, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 77 aaa-bbb (Supp. 1939)
to seek impromptly to impound income. However, if the debtor's operations are being
conducted at a cash loss, or its income is insufficient to meet operating expenses and
taxes, prompt application to impound income may be unwise. It is possible that by re-
fraining from so doing, the indenture trustee may preserve to itself a position similar
to that sanctioned by the MacGregor case, supra. On the other hand, a mere appear-
ance by counsel may be sufficient to impose the loss on the mortgaged property.
28. The limitations on the scope of corporate mortgages, particularly where con-
sumable property is involved, are not apparently sufficiently well known to the Bar.
See Brown v. Leo, 12 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; MCCLMLAND & FISHER, LAW
OF COPORATE MORTGAGE BOND ISSUES (937) c. 8. But cf. the Pennsylvania cases
which reach a contrary result.
29. Chapter X requires "proofs of claim" by creditors. The language is, unfor-
tunately, technical. See Heuston, note 2 supra at 1222.
3o. Chapter X, § 179.
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will protect the right to participate under the plan,3 1 and as to stock
where a list of holders can be made to perform the same function. If
contested claims are anticipated, they will usually be those of landlords
or contingent or trade creditors. Proof of such claims can be required
by separate order.
Adequate representation of parties in interest before the court on
administrative questions (as distinct from plan formulation) has
always been a serious problem. Under equity practice, the technicalities
of a foreclosure suit were rigidly observed. The parties before the
court, as of right, were the complaining creditor (who usually dropped
into a minor position almost immediately), the defendant (which, as
such, had little, if any, voice in a creditors' proceeding looking toward
its dismemberment), the indenture trustees and the receivers. Bond-
holders' committees often appeared, but no committee, no matter how
high a percentage of the issue it represented, could intervene over the
objection of its indenture trustee,, unless it could show a conflict of
interest or that its trustee was derelict in its duty.
82
Section 77B gave to all creditors and stockholders the right to be
heard on the question of the permanent appointment of any trustee
and on the proposed confirmation of any plan and "upon filing a peti-
tion for leave to intervene, on such other questions arising in the pro-
ceeding as the judge shall determine".8 This provision did not work
too well. Petitions for leave to intervene were commonly filed by
every individual creditor, stockholder or committee which 'wished to
express itself through counsel in the proceeding. Two distinct judicial
practices developed in dealing with these petitions. One school of
thought permitted interventions freely, expressing the view that to do
so gave no right which did not exist without intervention and that the
fact of intervention was clearly no ground for an allowance of com-
pensation and disbursements out of the estate. The other view re-
quired affirmative showing of a right to intervene, upon the theory
that without that right, no allowance could be granted nor appeal taken
from any order except, perhaps, on the two subjects specifically men-
tioned in the statute. The epitome of the views of this school of
judicial thought is perilously close to the equity receivership practice
with an added element-that of diligence in appearance on the scene.
3 4
31. Chapter X, § i9g.
32. Palmer v. Bankers Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). This doc-
trine was a convenient means of restricting active participation in receiverships to ma-
jority interests.
33. § 77B c (II).
34. See e. g., In re Paramount Publix Corp., 85 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936),
in which the court stated that compensation should be denied to any representative of
securityholders if a committee were already in the field, and was not somehow shown
to be "inadequate" in its representation of the issue. A district court rule was sug-
gested to deal with the point.
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Chapter X is clearer. Any creditor or stockholder may be heard
at any time upon any question, and indenture trustees are specifically
given the same right.3 5 Intervention has been reduced to what should
be its major purpose-to give the right to receive notice in advance of
motions and other steps to be taken in the proceeding. Under Section
207, the judge may, for cause shown, permit a party in interest to
intervene generally, or with respect to any specific matter and enter
orders designating the matters with respect to which, the persons to
whom and the form and manner in which notice shall be given. He
may also invite the S. E. C.'s active participation in the proceeding, or
the Commission may appear on its own motion with his approval.3 8
It seems to the writer that prudence dictates general interventions
by all indenture trustees and by at least one committee, large holder or
other representative of each class of securities. Where possible con-
flicts of interest or clear differences of view going beyond any single
issue appear among securityholders of the same class, greater liberality
in this regard seems indicated. Notice to all is a cure for many evils.
IV. THE REORGANIZATION PLAN
A. Its Formulation
The third stage-the process of formulation of a plan of reor-
ganization-may be likened to a poker game. The chips in the center
of the table (the debtor's property) must be divided in accordance
with the cards (claims) held by the players (creditors and stock-
holders) who have each contributed to the "pot". The problem is
essentially one of evaluation of the relative priorities of those claims,
to which must be added the elements of the size of the pot and its
eventual earning power.
Skill at the game is of substantial importance. Throughout the
history of reorganization, some individual or group of individuals rep-
resenting one or more classes of securityholders has, regardless of his or
its position in the particular proceeding, largely guided, if not dom-
inated its conduct and the formulation of a plan, by reason of general
intelligence, legal knowledge and experience at plain "horse-trading".
35. Chapter X, § 206.
36. Apparently, however, the S. E. C., could intervene in the public interest with-
out such invitation. Securities & Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Im-
provement Co., 6o Sup. Ct. iO44 (194o). The Commission does not participate actively
in all cases. Where cases were begun under Section 77B, the Commission seems to
have been reluctant to come very far into the picture, even where courts have made
Chapter X applicable. In cases where reference of the plan is not mandatory under
Chapter X, the debtor's liabilities being less than three million dollars, the Commis-
sion's decision as to whether or not to participate is probably dictated by the amount
of public investor interest which it considers present. Where reference is mandatory,
active participation usually follows.
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No statutory provision that can be drawn, save one providing for the
imposition of a plan conceived in vacuo by the court or an adminis-
trator,37 could change the fundamental nature of this process, nor was
it intended that it should be essentially changed.
The principal developments under the reorganization acts have
been three: first, to take from the majority senior creditors their
dominant position of being able to force foreclosure, cutting off all
junior interests, at any moment when they could agree among them-
selves; second, to bring the bargaining process in some measure into
the open; and third, to deprive the bargainers of the opportunity to
seek even theoretical rank and file support for the views they may
advance in the trading process.
The first of these developments is not traceable entirely to the
statutory provisions, though they were influential in producing it.
Under equity practice, the foreclosing senior creditors had to be satis-
fied-or they would not permit their juniors to participate in the pur-
chase. The burden rested on the junior interests to justify their par-
ticipation in the plan by establishing the existence of unmortgaged
property of substantial value. This accomplished, the equity rule for
the proving of secured claims at their full amount, without deduction, 8
often made the junior position still difficult of defense. The sale was
the final test. It was made at auction, and if the seniors would not
bid with credit on their indebtedness, the juniors were confronted with
the problem of raising cash with which to bid--often an impossible task.
Practically, therefore, the juniors took what they were offered.
Under 77B, the burden shifted. The debtor was often in posses-
sion. It could propose a plan without creditor or stockholder action.
The rule for the proof of secured claims was less onerous on junior
interests, requiring deduction of the value of security as in ordinary
bankruptcy.39 The Act required consent of two thirds of each class
of creditors for confirmation of a plan and of majorities of each class
of stock. The latter might be dispensed with upon proof of in-
solvency 40 but in a vast corporate enterprise that proof was difficult.
41
Not until some time after the Act did the Supreme Court uphold a
plan which eliminated junior creditors upon the ground that their
37. Cf. the power of the President under the N. I. R. A., to "impose" a code upon
a recalcitrant industry.
38. Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 13i (1899).
39. § 77B b (io).
40. § 77B b (4).
41. An early case under § 77B will serve to illustrate the point. In re Republic
Gas Corp. (S. D. N. Y. 1935), involved the valuation of natural gas reserves. Stock-
holders successfully contended that no estimate of the value of those reserves could be
found sufficiently accurate to justify an adjudication of insolvency. The case is unre-
ported, except for an opinion on allowances appearing at 14 F. Supp. 7o3 (S. D. N. Y.
1935).
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claims had no value.42  Debtors' counsel argued vigorously for the
"composition theory" of reorganization in bankruptcy, that the acts
were "for the relief of debtors", etc.43 These contentions have finally
been rejected by the Supreme Court.44 Their merit is not within the
purview of this article, but they serve to emphasize the point that under
the reorganization acts, as distinct from equity practice, the junior
creditor and the stockholder are entitled to participation in the plan
until proven not to be.
To return to the poker analogy, the key lies, of course, in valua-
tion of the "pot"-at best a difficult process.45 The 1935 Amendment
to Section 77 contains arresting language on this subject:
" . The value of any property used in railroad operation
shall be determined on a basis which will give due consideration
to the earning power of the property, past, present, and prospective,
and all other relevant facts. In determining such value only such
effect shall be given to the present cost of reproduction new and
less depreciation and original cost of the property, and the actual
investment therein, as may be required under the law of the land,
in light of its earning power and all other relevant facts."
However, it is not demonstrable that an earnings basis of valua-
tion has been controlling in the railroad cases, except in limiting new
capitalization in fixed income bonds to an amount service upon which
would be adequately covered in depression years and allocating such
bonds among securityholders on the basis of studies showing so-called
"segregated earnings" of various portions of the road upon which the
particular issue may be a prior lien. Income bond and stock capitaliza-
tions have reached much higher figures within the maximum fixed by
the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission's Valuation Divi-
sion on "Elements of Value".
46
In non-railroad cases, the problem is at once less complex. The
element of conflicting lien claims is usually not present, though there
may be some question as to the contribution to earnings fairly at-
tributable to unmortgaged assets. On the other hand, industrial prop-
erty is not always so specialized as railroad property and may be
42. In re 620 Church Street Bldg. Corp., 29 U. S. 24 (1936).
43. See e. g., In re Spokane International Ry., Reorganization, 228 L C. C. 387,
Finance Docket No. ioI31 (1938), particularly the briefs of the Debtor and Mr. Bal-
lard, as amicus curiae.
44. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. Io6 (1939).
45. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATIo oF PROPERTY (937).
46. Generally speaking, this has resulted in the elimination of stockholders' inter-
ests. However, a comparison of the percentage earned on Commission approved capi-
talizations in various plans on the basis of the average earnings of certain roads from
1926 to 1939 has been estimated as varying from z.8 to 4.99, averaging 3.3%. (Peti-
tion of the Ecker Committee, In re St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Reorganization, L C.
C. Finance Docket No. io,oo8, Sept. 3, 194o.)
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demonstrably saleable on a higher basis than an earnings valuation
would show. 4 7  Yet it seems that there is discernible in the S. E. C.
advisory reports on plans under Chapter X a clear tendency to lean
heavily upon capitalization of earnings as the most reliable valuation
base.
Apart from the soundness of the theory, discussion of which is
foreign to this article, the procedural advantage of such a relatively
simple yardstick to measure the right of junior creditors and stock-
holders to participate and to enable the senior interests to meet the
burden placed upon them by the acts is obvious. The danger is that
the future potentialities of businesses whose earnings are hypersensitive
to general conditions may be underestimated.
The second and third points of change mentioned above follow
more clearly from the reorganization acts themselves and, particularly,
from Chapter X. The focussing of responsibility in the trustee for the
recommendation of a plan to be considered by the court seems, in a
sense, a compromise between the equity procedure, where, as pointed
out above, but one plan might be considered with consequent disad-
vantage to the objector, and that under Section 77B, where proposal
of a complete new plan by a single creditor or stockholder, as an
"amendment" to a pending plan, effectively nullified the statutory per-
centage requirements for proposal by creditors or stockholders, once a
plan was before the court. The trustee's plan will have the advantage
of having been worked out after statutory notice to all that sugges-
tions may be submitted, 48 perhaps after informal hearings or confer-
ences presided over by the trustee and open to attendance by all parties
in interest. When it is reported to the court for consideration, time
may be saved by the trustee being prepared to explain his rejection of
proposals advanced for the second time.
-The place of the S. E. C. in plan formulation is more difficult to
evaluate. Technically, unless it has intervened in the proceeding, it
has no position until one or more plans be submitted for advisory
report. Practically, however, its position is a powerful one calling for
the exercise of great restraint. The Commission's policy has apparently
been to make the services of its staff available to trustees and other
participants in Chapter X proceedings when such services have been
requested, seeking to guide rather than to dominate the plan formula-
tion process, primarily by raising, without the expression of any view,
what seem to the staff to be debatable issues.
47. Cf. a real estate case, or that of a motion picture theatre where ownership, man-
agement and availability of film are often closely intertwined, e. g., In re Roxy Theatres
Corp. (S. D. N. Y. 1937) (unreported).
48. Chapter X, § z67 (6).
CONDUCT OF REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS
. Chapter X specifically forbids solicitation of assents to any plan
prior to its approval by the court and the filing of the S. E. C. advisory
report, if any, unless the judge shall specially sanction such solicita-
tion.49 The Commission early adopted a policy of opposition to any
such application. The problem thus becomes in even greater measure
one of personnel. Who is to speak, in the plan formulation process,
for the rank and file whose rights and interests are to be dealt with?
No better method of securityholder representation in reorganiza-
tion proceedings has yet been found than the committee system. The
origins of that system under equity receivership practice are well
recognized. Underwriting houses responsible for the flotation of the
debtor's securities, being advised of the existence or imminence of a
default and consequent receivership, formed committees from among
their personnel or customers to represent the various classes of se-
curities, and employed counsel who prepared deposit agreements under
which the securities were delivered to a depositary whose negotiable
certificates of deposit, or receipts, were issued therefor.
The powers of committees under these agreements were extremely
broad. They could, and did, customarily, pledge the deposited se-
curities for substantial loans to pay committee expenses and sometimes
compensation to committee members, or for the use of the office
facilities of one or more underwriting houses. The committee's ex-
penses and compensation were a prior lien upon the deposited securities
and the agreements were commonly so drawn that the committee itself
had full discretion in fixing its own compensation and in passing upon
the compensation of its agents, counsel and other employees. The
system was undoubtedly abused.50
If the company were reorganized, the depositing securityholder
had no direct concern with these expenses. They were paid by the
reorganized company (outside of the jurisdiction of the court) as an
incident to consummation of the plan.51 If they were high, the work-
ing capital position of the reorganized company suffered accordingly.
If, however, reorganization did not take place, an anomalous situation
was created. The cash proceeds of the sale of the liquidated enterprise
would be distributed on the deposited securities to the committee which
would deduct a pro rata share of its expenses and, perhaps, compensa-
tion, while the non-depositing holder would receive a higher dividend.
49. Chapter X, 1 176.
50. Bills of particulars will be found in many places, e. g., LOWENTHAL, THE IN-
VESTOR PAYS (1933) Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities,
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, published by
the Securities & Exchange Commission from 1936 to I94o.
51. FixrrErr, op. cit. supra note 2 at I7; GzmDs, op. cit. supra note 2 at 6o-6i.
Cf. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. R., 282 U. S. 311
(1931).
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The deposit agreement also customarily provided that depositors might
be bound to assent to a plan of reorganization by published notice of a
resolution of the committee adopting the plan (copies being available
upon application to the depositary), plus the expiration of, perhaps,
twenty days from the date of that notice, within which the depositor
might withdraw his security upon payment to the depositary in cash of
his pro rata share of the committee's expenses and compensation, at a
figure fixed arbitrarily by the committee.
These practices led to an unwillingness among investors, nurtured
by their advisors, banks, investment services, brokerage houses, etc.,
to deposit their bonds. An immediate market differential between
certificates of deposit and actual securities would appear because of
the fear of assessment for withdrawing the security. Advice was
freely given to investors not to deposit their securities with any com-
mittee until a plan had actually been promulgated and its terms made
public. If then, the securityholder wished to accept that plan, he might
be advised to deposit, but not otherwise. Resistance to the plea for
deposits, combined with the necessity for payment in cash to the dis-
senting securityholders, made difficult the task of assembling sufficient
support to put through a plan under equity practice. Perhaps, even
the representation necessary to instruct the indenture trustee might not
be obtained.
Section 77B, by eliminating the sale as a method of consummating
a plan, did away with the necessity for the committee as purchaser
at a sale to have physical possession of the bonds it represented, in
order to present them in part payment of the purchase price. The
Securities Act of 1933 required the registration of certificates of de-
posit as issues of new securities where they were offered, as was usual,
at the early stages of a receivership or reorganization proceeding,
before a court could pass upon their terms. Committees, therefore, no
longer sought deposits. They sought proxies or powers of attorney
giving them the right generally to represent the securityholder in the
proceeding which were not, of course, registerable as "securities".
Under these proxies, no borrowing for committee expenses or fees for
withdrawal were possible. In large measure, however, the harm had
already been done. Although no precise statistics are available, it is
believed that, generally speaking, committee representation in recent
years has been much less substantial than before the reorganization
acts. Despite the removal of the possible assessment for withdrawing
the securities and the introduction of court supervision over fees and
expenses, there remains a general feeling among securityholders that
unless and until a specific plan is submitted for their views, they may
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in some manner prejudice themselves by authorizing a committee to
speak for them.
By Section 77B, the reorganization court was given specific power
over the terms of deposit agreements which it could ignore, amend or
alter at will and all committee compensation and expenses in connec-
tion with plans consummated under the Section required specific ap-
proval of the court.52 The provisions are carried over and added to
in Chapter X.53
At the time when the Chandler Act was pending in Congress,
there was also pending the Lea Bill for the regulation of the solicitation
of proxies, deposits or assents. The text of Chapter X apparently
contemplated the enactment of this bill for it requires that no agent,
indenture trustee or committee purporting to represent creditors or
stockholders shall be heard or allowed to intervene until the court has
been satisfied that "they have complied with all applicable laws regu-
lating the activities and personnel of such persons". 4 In addition,
Chapter X provides that any attorney for creditors or stockholders
must, before he can be heard, file with the court a statement setting
forth the names and addresses of his clients, the nature and amounts
of their claims or stock and when the same were acquired, unless they
were acquired more than a year prior to the filing of the petition.
Protective committees or any other person purporting to represent more
than twelve creditors or stockholders and every indenture trustee must
file a statement including a copy of the instrument empowering him to
act, the facts in connection with the selection or employment of such
person, committee or trustee, the amounts of claims or stock owned
by such person, committee member or indenture trustee when em-
ployed or organized, the dates of acquisition, the prices paid, the
amounts sold and a showing as to amounts of claims or stock repre-
sented "with an averment that each holder of such claims or stock
acquired them at least one year before the filing of the petition or with
a showing of the times of acquisition thereof". 55
These provisions of Chapter X are obviously aimed at attorneys'
appearances in court attacking the plan or the principal interested
parties, or both, but successfully evading all demands that they state
52. § 77B b (io), c (9).
53. Chapter X, §§ 211-213.
54. Chapter X, § 213. The Lea Bill (H. R. Rep. No. 6968, 75th Cong., ist Sess.,
1937) failed of passage. There are, however, several state laws requiring qualification
of committees before some state body before they can function. E. g., CAl. GE . LAWS
(Deering, 1937) 3815. In many cases, the Proxy Rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission will also apply and must, presumably, be complied with to satisfy the re-
quirements of Section 213.
55. Chapter X, §§ 210-211.
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exactly whom they represent, the amounts of securities owned by their
clients and when those securities were acquired. 56
Provided that all of these requirements have been complied with,
Chapter X gives an undoubted right to committee members to receive
compensation and reimbursement of their expenses out of the estate
upon allowance thereof by the court.
However, it would seem that statute cannot alone rehabilitate the
committee system. Effective securityholder representation is dependent
first upon the willingness of the average securityholder to grant to a
committee or other representative authority to participate in the pro-
ceedings and in the formulation of a plan on his behalf, and second,
upon the willingness of experienced and honorable men to serve as
members of committees. The first issue has not, it is felt, been suc-
cessfully met by the statutory provisions, nor can it be. It is arguable
that securityholders will not again be willing, in large number, to
entrust their fortunes to protective committees until the record of pro-
tective committees justifies it. The statutory provisions summarized
above are an attempt to meet the second issue, but in a negative fashion,
by making it difficult for self-seekers representing no real interest, or
having some past connection with the particular securities or the debtor,
to solicit proxies, by requiring full disclosure in advance.
Undoubtedly, the red tape involved in the organization of com-
mittees to function in proceedings under Chapter X has had a deterrent
effect. The principal deterrent, however, seems to be one the remedy
for which lies not with Congress but with the courts. Unfortunately,
much of the criticism of reorganization committees has been based
upon the fees paid to their members. The result has been a public
impression that committee members and, indeed, all counsel participat-
ing in reorganizations, are bound to be handsomely paid and an equiva-
lent "conviction among experienced practitioners that compensation will
probably be inadequate, if not niggardly. The 1935 amendments to
Section 77 embodied a congressional policy forbidding the payment of
compensation to committee members in railroad cases. The result has
been an unfortunate one. Since that enactment, there have been practi-
cally no committees formed to represent railroad securityholders. The
insurance companies, savings banks and other institutional holders of
railroad securities have organized for their own protection, but their in-
terests are not and cannot be precisely similar to those of the smaller
investor. They usually hold more than one issue and are thus inter-
ested in a reorganization plan which makes provision for all issues and
in the compromise of controversies which may seriously injure the
s6. Heuston, note 2 supra at 1225.
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rights of holders of one or more issues, to the advantage of another.
These institutional holders have made no bones about the positions
they have taken. They have publicly stated that they do not act in
reorganization proceedings as fiduciaries for anyone except their policy-
holders or depositors.57 Thus, the interests of the individual security-
holder are left unrepresented except, in the case of indenture securities,
by the indenture trustee which has no beneficial interest in the outcome
and has not been encouraged by the courts. 58
Reorganization courts in recent years have been all too anxious
to make a record for economy in the administration of estates. At the
time .when applications for allowances are made, the work has been
done, the plan has been confirmed, the property is about to be trans-
ferred to the reorganized company,-what is the cost to be? It is
believed that courts have far too often yielded to the pressure of unin-
formed public opinion that the cost of reorganizations in general is too
high and, thus, in effect, forced committee members and others, ex post
facto, to render services for what can only be described as wholly
inadequate and meager compensation. 9 They will, naturally, be slow
57. Such groups are organized pursuant to subsection (p) of Section 77. Eminent
counsel for a large insurance company has said:
".. . But this further effect it [the formation of groups of institutional security-
holders] has and will have: more and more, single-minded insistence upon the
rights of any particular class of securityholders, their priorities, and the security
to which they are entitled, will be subordinated to the inability on the part of all
to do other than compromise those rights in order to put through a plan. The
tendency of the past to compromise will be unduly accentuated. Priorities which
have been bought and paid for will be to an extent further diluted in the interests
of compromise and expedition. This is true because there will be no one respon-
sible committee looking after any particular class but all will be talking together
as the holders of various classes. In the sense of cooperatively working together,
this is fine. In the sense of upholding the priorities which have been paid for in
high prices and low yields, it is bad." Shanks, The Law of Railroad Reorganiza-
tion as Affecting Institutional Investors (a paper read before the Association of
Life Insurance Counsel, December 3, 1935) 333.
58. An apt illustration is afforded by the positions of the group of insurance com-
panies and the group of mutual savings banks in the reorganization proceedings affect-
ing the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, now pending before
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The insurance group holds approximately 14%
of the New Haven First & Refunding bonds (the largest system issue). The savings
bank group holds approximately the same percentage. The latter group, however, also
holds approximately 49% of the First Mortgage bonds of Old Colony Railroad Com-
pany, the lease of whose properties has been rejected by the New Haven Trustees. One
of the most serious questions confronting the Commission and the Court in the New
Haven case is whether or not the Old Colony lines should be included in the New
Haven system as reorganized. The two groups have taken diametrically opposite posi-
tions on the point, each position logically dictated by the holdings of the group. The
indenture trustee of the New Haven First & Refunding Mortgage has filed briefs dif-
fering in view from both the groups, but its position is not an enviable one. Save for
an independent committee representing about i% of the issue, it must perforce speak
for a silent majority (7o% or more holding over $xoo,ooo,ooo principal amount of
bonds) with all the handicaps of a trustee bound to take account of the views of the
two largest holders of its indenture securities.
59. An extreme instance is the case of In re Detroit International Bridge Co., li
F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 6th, i94o), where the District Court, apparently under news-
paper pressure, made allowances to the committees and counsel not only far below the
amounts asked, but far below those recommended by the S. E. C. An appeal was taken
and the allowances substantially increased, but not even to the S. E. C. figures.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
another time to take on the burden, leaving it to less experienced,
capable or qualified personnel.
Where committee members are affiliated with underwriting houses,
the argument can be made that on the basis of moral responsibility, the
level of compensation should be low. Where they are large security-
holders, the argument can be made that they are protecting their own
interests for which they would not be compensated out of the estate
except for their willingness to undertake the protection of others
similarly situated; that therefore, here too, the level of compensation
should be low.
6 °
Inconsistently enough, when either of these situations obtains, the
argument is often heard that the committee represents no real or sub-
stantial interest; that compensation should, therefore, be held down in
order to discourage self-seeking committees.
Of course, these arguments are extremes. They are not always
voiced, nor have they been by any means universally heeded by the
courts. However, unless and until some better means be devised, the
committee system should be fostered and encouraged. Only through
it can representatives of substantial groups of securityholders come
before the court clothed with the fiduciary responsibility which they
should bear. One may venture the prediction that with the continued
requirements for full disclosure of prior interest, as required by Chap-
ter X, the quality of committee representation of securityholders will
improve, as the federal courts hew more nearly to the line that the
laborer, particularly where he shares none of the moral responsibility
for the debtor's difficulties, is worthy, not of excessive, but of reason-
able hire.
The indenture trustee is in a somewhat similar situation. From
the equity proceeding, where the indenture trustee was the major
litigant, the pendulum swung completely in the other direction under
77B. Many reorganization courts took the view that the indenture
trustee, as a mere stakeholder, had substantially no place in reorganiza-
tion proceedings and should be compensated meagerly, if at all. But
the indenture trustee is mentioned many times in the text of Chapter X
which apparently contemplates that it shall take an active part in the
proceedings. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 61 seems to contemplate
6o. In one recent case, it was argued that the largest securityholder, which had
proposed the plan and borne the burden of conducting the proceedings, should not be
compensated at all because it was protecting its own interests; that regardless of the
prospect of compensation from the estate, it would nevertheless have undertaken and
carried through the task. The contention was rejected by the Securities & Exchange
Commission and the court. In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp. (S. D. N. Y. 1940)
(unreported).
6x. 53 STAT. 1,49, 15 U. S. C. A. H 77aaa-bbb (Supp. 1939) ; note 25 supra.
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-the same thing. Under these circumstances, a reversal of the trend
seems indicated.
62
B. Court Consideration
At least until the Supreme Court dicta in the Coriell and Flershem
cases 63 indicated the necessity for full court consideration of a plan
regardless of the preponderance of securityholder support for it, the
hearings on the plan under equity procedure were likely to be some-
what perfunctory. Often, they consisted purely of argument. Section
77B made no different requirement and under it, two circuit courts of
appeals held, despite the dicta, that the burden of proof in favor of
the fairness, equity, and feasibility of a pending plan was largely met
by the fact that it had the requisite securityholder support. 64
The Supreme Court emphatically rejected this doctrine and re-
affirmed the views expressed in the Coriell and Flershem opinions by
its recent decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.
65
The court must, therefore, form its independent judgment of
fairness, equity and feasibility after full hearing upon all available
evidence. In the writer's view, this requires not only argument, but
actual proof. The published advisory reports of the S. E. C. give
some indication of the nature of such proof-indeed, it is a fair
assumption that the Commission, rather than the courts, has had a
major share in outlining the requirements and in seeing to it that they
are met. A complete history of the business and its financing seems
first called for; then, some attention to its management and opera-
tions; the probable causes of its troubles; its physical assets and finan-
cial condition; its place in the economic sun, generally and in the par-
ticular industry; its earnings, past, present and estimated for the future.
62. The language of Chapter X is somewhat similar to that of Section 77 under
which the problem has arisen, particularly in connection with compensation to indenture
trustees, of determining whether or not services rendered directly benefited the debt-
or's estate, as distinct from the particular class of creditors represented, and there has
been a tendency in some decisions to refuse compensation for the latter type of service:
e. g., services in connection with a controversy between conflicting creditor groups as
to their respective priorities. The conduct of this type of controversy is, in the writer's
view, often one of the most important functions of an indenture trustee or a committee.
A broad view would include such services within the statutory language. This con-
struction was adopted by District Judge Hincks in a recent decision in In the Matter of
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. (D. Conn. 194o) (unreported). Contra:
Straus v. Baker Co., 87 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) semble. The problem is suc-
cinctly stated and the issues drawn in the testimony of Alfred N. Heuston, Esq.
Hearings before the Special Sub-Committee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on S. 1869 (The Wheeler-
Truman Railroad Reorganization Bill), 76th Cong., ist Sess. (1939) 389 et seq.
63. See First Nat'l Bk. v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 525 (1934) ; National Surety
Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426, 436 (1933).
64. Downtown Inv. Ass'n. v. Boston Met. Bldgs., Inc., 81 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A.
Ist, 1936); In re New Rochelle Coal and Lumber Co., 77 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935).
65. 308 U. S. io6 (194o).
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Valuation evidence is vitally necessary and here it would seem from
the published reports that, as pointed out above, emphasis upon valua-
tions, based primarily, if not entirely, upon earnings, is in the ascendant.
Finally, it seems highly desirable that some person, perhaps the trustee
or member of a committee appearing in support of the plan under
review, testify to the reasoning by which the adjustments of rights
embodied in the plan between the various classes of securityholders
were arrived at.
In addition to embodying certain requirements and prohibitions
as to the contents of a plan, its course from preparation to consumma-
tion is carefully charted by Chapter X. 68 Up to the point of sub-
mission to the S. E. C., the trustee or the proponent of the proposed
plan or plans (for more than one may be considered at the same
time) 67 must assume the burden of producing the evidence. If it be
the trustee, he may become anomalously an advocate between contest-
ing groups. The Commission holds no hearings and has adopted a
policy of not filing advisory reports in all cases in which it participates,
but only in those considered to involve a public investor interest, or
referred to it under the mandatory provisions of Chapter X.
Once the Commission report is filed (or the Commission advises
that it will not file one), the judge will determine which plan or plans
comply with the Act, approve them and order them sent to those en-
titled to vote thereon, together with his opinion and the S. E. C. report,
if any, or summaries thereof. Thus is the fourth stage-that of con-
summation-reached.
V. CONSUMMATION
Under equity practice the mechanics of property transfers were,
perhaps, more complex than the now permitted procedure of handing
the debtor back its property, but the assumption of reorganization
expense (particularly committee fees and disbursements, as distinct
from compensation of receivers and indenture trustees), the creation
of the new company, and the issuance and distribution of its securities
were extra-judicial functions. After confirmation of the sale, the court
was concerned merely with special masters' and receivers' reports and
accounts ending finally in an "order of distribution" which, for prac-
tical purposes, directed only the making of the payments to dissenting
creditors. This process has been materially changed by the reorganiza-
tion acts.
66. A succinct summary of Chapter X from both these points of view is contained
in Heuston, note 2 suprc at 1213-1217.
67. Chapter X, § 172.
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Section 77B removed much of the fictional aspect of this pro-
cedure, but added to the court's burdens those of approving new in-
dentures, supervising the mechanics of distribution of new securities
and making allowances to any and all persons claiming to be entitled
to compensation from the estate, including committees and their counsel
and even individual securityholders.
Chapter X adds to the fourth stage some uncertainty as to
securityholder acceptance of the plan or plans submitted to them. The
policy of the statute in forbidding the solicitation of acceptances until
the fourth stage may be said to be somewhat paternalistic. It requires
acceptance of the thesis that it is better to have no expression of
securityholders' views in advance of court and Commission considera-
tion of a plan, than to have an expression which may have been sought
or influenced by self-seeking interests, the disclosure of which 68 is not
considered sufficient without the protective cloak of the court's affirm-
ative view and the Commission's advice pro or con as the case may be.
Securityholder inertia is largely discounted by the limitation of
the right to vote to those who have proven their claims.69 From a
policy standpoint, however, the vote should be an intelligent one-and
the judicious use of simple language and summaries of court opinions
and the Commission reports is a prerequisite. Otherwise, the tendency
to throw a voluminous dossier, bristling with tables and figures, into
the wastebasket may prevail and the fate of the plan be decided by a
very small number of the real parties in interest.
How far court and Commission approval or Commission dissent
on the fairness of particular plans have weighted securityholder action
is a question difficult of accurate analysis.t 0 Fundamentally, the prob-
lem is human and psychological. No matter what the statutory set-up,
so long as securityholder action is sought as the court of last appeal,
the process for expression of those views should be made simple and
such expression encouraged. One thought may be worth consideration
and is possible under the present text of Chapter X. It may prove
useful to permit solicitation at any point in the proceeding, at least on
particular issues, 71 provided that the time of mailing and the text of
all literature be passed upon by the court after hearing all intervenors,
so that, if opposite views be expressed by parties before the court,
68. Through their statements filed under § 211, and if required, through their proxy
statements.
69. See supra p. 73.
7o. Even a check of the Commission s records to investigate the acceptance or re-
jection of its views as expressed in the advisory reports would not tell the whole story
without a detailed knowledge of the history of negotiation and compromise in each
particular case.
71. A good example would be to offer securityholders a choice between a program
of reorganization or liquidation, or between two available types of capitalization.
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securityholders will receive full and fair statements substantially
simultaneously.
VI. CONCLUSION
Summarization of the developments under the reorganization acts
and assessment of their desirability from the policy standpoint is not
easy, nor can any expression be other than a personal view. Many
aspects--some important-are untouched here. If others have been
labored, let the desire for emphasis and clarity be pleaded in exten-
uation.
The federal equity receivership was not only a fictitious device
used to accomplish a purpose for which it was not originally designed,
but its very complexity made it malleable in the hands of expert tech-
nicians, sometimes to the substantial disadvantage of the small security-
holder. Interests in charge of reorganizations were and are often self-
seeking. They sometimes abused the broad discretionary powers given
them by deposit agreements and paid themselves unconscionable com-
pensation, free from court control. On the other hand, the reorganiza-
tion bar chafed at the technicalities and fictions of equity procedure.
The decision of the Boyd case 72 and other decisions following it
demonstrated the need for a method by which a final decree of un-
doubted validity, secure against direct or collateral attack, might be
available for the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose-reorganiza-
tion of a corporate enterprise-upon the basis of a plan approved by the
court prior, not subsequent, to transfer of the properties. The necessity
for financing payments to dissenting creditors was a serious obstacle
and the upset price in many cases provided inadequate protection to
the minority.
The reorganization acts have not removed the factor of com-
plexity. Skill at reorganization practice is acquired only by experience
and precedent still lies largely in the equity cases. The reorganization
acts and particularly Chapter X, have charted the main steps in a
proceeding, but the text alone cannot supply the technique for its ex-
peditious use. Some of the statutory steps may in one case be factors
making for delay, in another, necessary protections for the vital inter-
ests of minorities. Whereas the problem of obtaining jurisdiction
over the debtor's property has been simplified, the problem of the per-
sonnel of management during the proceedings remains. Representa-
tion of scurityholders has been subjected to the requirement of full
disclosure and the courts have acquired complete control of compensa-
tion to securityholder representatives. The problem of education of
72. Northern Pacific R. R. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
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-the average securityholder to the need of intelligent representation
throughout the proceeding and to an understanding of the material
upon which his intelligent vote upon a plan should be based cannot be
coped with by statute. The Securities and Exchange Commission has
made and seems to be making a valiant effort at simplification of
solicitation material, but there is some doubt as to the wisdom of the
policy implicit in the statutory scheme of presenting to the rank and
file of securityholders only a completed and approved plan. After the
major portion of the proceedings has been completed, the burden placed
upon the dissenter at this point is not so serious as that confronting
the minority under equity practice. The opportunity to appear in the
proceedings and express a dissenting voice at an earlier stage clearly
exists under the statute. "Democratization" of reorganization prac-
tice--one of the objects of the Chandler Act-requires that that op-
portunity be widely exercised, but in the long run, the human problem
remains and the effectiveness of the expression of the securityholder's
views in the course of the proceeding will be dependent upon the skill
and experience of his counsel and, perhaps, the aid of the Securities
and Exchange Commission staff.
Some experienced practitioners are reluctant today to appear in
reorganization proceedings unless they represent substantial security-
holdings, whether scattered or concentrated. It may be desirable that
the representative of a single bond, sufficiently experienced and skilled to
assume a major share of the burden of the proceeding or the negotia-
tion of a plan, should be as well compensated as counsel for large hold-
ings. The Bar at large and the courts do not, however, seem to have
accepted this view. Either it must be accepted, or the road of a com-
mittee should be made easier. In the long run, only experience under
the acts, and intelligent cooperation by participants in proceedings with
the Commission and the courts can lead to constructive solution of
problems such as this, and to further much needed improvement in
reorganization practice and procedure.
